



Familiar Solutions

How withdrawal provisions affect state
ratification preferences

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- Proliferation of international institutions
- Repeated decision-making within regime complex
- Exposure to standard design features (withdrawal mechanisms, depository rules, preambles, etc.)

Does prior exposure to standard treaty design features (e.g. specific types of withdrawal provisions) within a regime complex affect new ratification decisions?

The Mere Exposure Effect (Zajonc 1980; 2001)

A B C D



Mere Exposure Effect and State Decision-making

Operates on:

1) Individual decision-makers

- Conscious (but often with post hoc rationalizations)
- Unconscious (“looks about right”)

2) States

- Efficiency gains

Most likely when:

- stakes are low (high stakes decisions may be more prone to careful deliberation) ?

MEAs:

- Free-riding incentives in environmental area
- Broad participation is needed but difficult to achieve

Withdrawal clauses:


- Standard design feature that lets states exit (unilaterally)
- Increase flexibility → likely to impact ratification (Koremenos & Nau 2010)

Article 28

1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depository.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depository of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Agreement.

(Paris Agreement)

Withdrawal Notification Periods of MEAs signed 1994-2014



With 619 MEAs signed by 2014, states had made 6355 MEA ratification decisions (that's a lot of exposure opportunity!)

Withdrawal Notification Period

- > 12 months
- 12 months
- < 12 months
- No notification period given

Hypotheses:


H1:

- An MEA is more likely to be ratified by a state the more prior MEAs with similar withdrawal clauses that specific state has ratified in the past.

H2:

- An MEA is more likely to be ratified by a state the more prior MEAs with similar withdrawal clauses have been adopted within the environmental regime complex.

Four Sample MEAs 1994-2014



H1: If CAN has been exposed to green type provision through ICRW is it more likely to join NAAEC that also has a green provision or ICHSF with a blue provision next?

- Data:
 - Network data over time
 - Monadic, dyadic and network structural covariates
- Actors:
 - evaluate how changing each tie affects value of their objective function (goal = maximize the objective function)
- Interpretation (like logistic regression):
 - Outcome: Tie presence (ratification occurs) vs. absence (failure to ratify or withdrawal)
 - Each effect represents how a 1-unit change in effect statistic affects the log-odds of a tie, all else equal.

RSiena

SAOM Results



Main Findings

	1994-2004	2004-2014
STATE MEAS WITH SAME NOTIFICATION PERIOD (SQRT)	0.966 (0.114) ^{***}	1.750 (0.367) ^{***}
GLOBAL MEAS WITH SAME NOTIFICATION PERIOD (SQRT)	0.032 (0.015) [*]	-0.029 (0.013) [*]
<i>Structural controls</i>		
SHARED MEMBER (4-CYCLES)	0.005 (0.001) ^{***}	0.003 (0.000) ^{***}
MEA POPULARITY (SQRT)	0.324 (0.026) ^{***}	0.270 (0.029) ^{***}
ONLY MEMBER	-2.491 (0.297) ^{***}	-1.858 (0.364) ^{***}
<i>Other controls</i>		
DELEGATION INDEX	1.145 (0.057) ^{***}	-0.038 (0.052)
ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATION	0.531 (0.106) ^{***}	0.697 (0.090) ^{***}
FLEXIBILITY	-0.401 (0.074) ^{**}	0.186 (0.066) ^{**}
IDEAL POINT DIFFERENCE (MEAN)	-0.110 (0.068)	-0.057 (0.065)
NO MEA NOTIFICATION PERIOD	1.493 (0.156) ^{***}	0.216 (0.243)
MEA NOTIFICATION PERIOD < 12 MONTHS	1.304 (0.195) ^{***}	1.442 (0.153) ^{***}
MEA NOTIFICATION PERIOD > 12 MONTHS	-1.758 (0.442) ^{***}	11.997 (1.300) ^{***}
MEA NOTIFICATION PERIOD = 12 MONTHS (reference category)		
REGIME	0.068 (0.023) ^{**}	0.144 (0.068) [*]
POWER	0.000 (NA)	0.000 (NA)
HARD ENFORCEMENT	0.354 (0.105) ^{***}	-1.150 (0.223) ^{***}

- + Subject controls (excluded for readability)
- + Universal membership

- Direct exposure to withdrawal provisions impacts ratification decisions
 - but there is mixed evidence only of an indirect effect.
- **Incentives for coherence?**
 - States are more likely to ratify MEAs with withdrawal clauses they have agreed more often previously.
- Yet, rational design insights on formulation may also matter: longer withdrawal clauses are still more popular than shorter ones in most recent years (all else equal).

What Next?

- When does exposure trump other influences on preference formation?
- How much exposure is too much in this context?
- Is direct or indirect exposure more effective?
- If states are incentivized to ratify what they are familiar with, how can they be encouraged to agree to design experiments/novelties?
- Does this effect also operate across regime complexes?
- Other standard design features and exposure?