Legislating Globalization: Trade and Immigration Bills in the United States House of Representatives [*]

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Abstract

Do concerns over American jobs motivate demand for protectionist trade and restrictive immigration reforms, as current U.S. political rhetoric suggests? Our answers are yes and no respectively. We investigate the economic predictors of trade and immigration policy to uncover whether Congressional support for legislation in these areas is tied to local labor market conditions. We examine the content of over 4000 bills introduced in Congress, 2005-2016. Few studies have compared trends in immigration and trade legislation; all have focused on roll-call votes to understand Congressional support. We analyze sponsorship and co-sponsorship activity to uncover patterns of support before party leadership whittles down the legislative agenda. We uncover economic roots in both trade and immigration policy. These ties reinforce party positions for Democrats and cut across party positions for Republicans. Both Democrat and Republican legislators who represent districts hardest hit by trade promote liberalization at lower rates, while those who represent districts which employ larger numbers of low-skill workers are *less* supportive of restrictive immigrant policies. While partisanship certainly divides the parties, we show how local economic conditions and party elite shape the direction of these key policy issues, steering U.S. global engagement.

1 Introduction

In June of 2019, the Trump administration threatened trade retaliation against Mexico, America's third largest trading partner, if the Mexican government does not take significant steps to curb migration into the United States across their shared border. The move highlights a fundamental link between trade and immigration in politics today. Economists have long regarded these issues as intimately tied through the labor market: heightened import competition and an increase in the labor supply could reduce wages for some categories of domestic workers, although their net impact may be neutral or even positive for the overall economy. Despite political rhetoric and economic theory, political scientists have largely addressed these issues separately. In this paper, we investigate whether local economic conditions predict legislator support for trade and immigration policy, and if they do, are those predictions consistent with our expectations?

A decade of economic growth leading to historically low unemployment has been felt unevenly across the United States workforce. Many Americans struggle to find good jobs and public attention has increasingly shifted to trade and immigration reform. Trade and immigration policy ignite controversy over the loss of American jobs to foreigners, abroad and at home. They activate dissent between groups who have prospered from the new global economy and those who have fallen behind. In addition to this economic response, cultural and social identities bias the expectations individuals hold about the consequences of open trade and permissive immigration policy (Margalit, 2012; Goldstein and Peters, 2014; Mutz and Kim, 2017).

Between 2005 and 2016, US Congress considered several thousand bills as part of its effort to set federal trade and immigration policy. This proposed legislation charts out terms for the movement of goods, jobs and people across borders. Their provisions define cooperative agreements between trading partners, trade adjustment assistance, tariff rates, the number of high-skilled and low-skilled worker visas, and the review process for asylum-seekers. Of the four thousand bills introduced in the House of Representatives, less than three percent traversed the Committee process to receive an 'up or down vote' on the House floor and less than one percent became public law. The party leadership has significant gate-keeping powers to block legislation that does not advance its policy agenda, even bills sponsored by members of its own party. Little is known about the content of trade and immigration bills apart from that sliver leadership brings to the floor for a vote.

We argue that bills which are proposed but sidelined provide important insight into the current development of US policy with respect to economic globalization. Our analysis of all proposed legislation, not just those that receive roll call votes, unpacks the sources of conflict over trade and immigration policy by linking these bills to regional economic conditions. When partisan conflict leads to inaction, as it has for immigration and more recently for trade policy, patterns of bills sponsorship and cosponsorship can improve understanding of the pressures acting upon members of Congress from constituents and interest groups. The implications are significant. Scholars have pointed to a widespread populist backlash against globalization to explain the US election of Donald Trump, and highlighted parallel trends with the "Brexit" vote. And yet, the majority of Americans heading into the 2016 presidential elections did not rank trade as a top issue and felt it was overall good for the economy. Trump supporters stood out as exceptional in their opposition to immigration and free trade deals (PEW public opinion polls). Do members of Congress advance prescient positions in the years before?

This paper remedies a major gap in the collective knowledge: we present new data on the *direction* of all trade and immigration bills proposed in the House of Representatives between 2005 and 2016. There are two ways in which this advances the scholarship. First, while previous literature on Congress has examined sponsorship of bills and partisan aspects of the attrition of legislation, no previous work we are aware of systematically examines the *direction* of policy on these crucial issues. We code 4,321 bills as protectionist versus liberalizing, in the case of trade, and restrictive versus permissive, in the case of immigration. Second, we bring into concert two issue areas crucial to economic globalization. Economists have long recognized that trade and immigration politics are fundamentally tied by their impact on local labor markets (e.g. Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992; Borjas et al. 1997; Dunlevy and Hutchinson 1999; Wood 1995; Abowd and Freeman 2007; Scheve and Slaughter 2001*a*; Hatton and Williamson 2005). Yet with a few exceptions, the international political economy scholarship has treated trade and immigration policy as separate points of inquiry (e.g. Hatton and Williamson 2007; Geddes and Money 2011; Peters 2014, 2015, 2017).

Leveraging these novel data, we offer two main findings. First, we show that legislators propose and support trade bills that directly reflect labor market conditions in their districts. Districts that specialize in manufacturing or suffer a negative trade balance in the sectors in which the majority of their workers are employed, are the major proponents of trade protection. Liberaliz-

ing policy originates from districts dominated by industries that have been the major "winners" of economic globalization. Second, we show that common economic explanations for immigration restrictions—competition for limited jobs among low-skilled workers—has tenuous support at best. Party platforms and general economic malaise, rather than specific job concerns, are strong predictors of legislator support for immigration restrictions. Our findings dispel political rhetoric that, like trade policy, immigration reform is about protecting workers.

Our findings lend insight into the political process that steers US global economic engagement. Despite local economic origins of trade policy and pockets of globalization backlash, the political process in Congress remains a dominant force. We examine the direction of bills as they proceed through the legislative process, from introduction to passage. There are distinct discrepancies in the average policy positions of introduced bills compared to those bills that advance with the consent of party elite. On both trade and immigration, legislation is pushed towards a more moderate position; trade policy becomes more liberal and immigration policy becomes more permissive as bills progress. This shift may reflect the party elite's efforts to secure support, balance competing regional interests, or block legislation which does not promote the majority party's policy goals. In the sections that follow, we provide evidence that local economic conditions sew the seed but institutional arrangements shape policy attrition, ultimately charting the direction of public law.

2   Legislating Globalization in US Congress

Trade and immigration politics are "profoundly interrelated" through the labor market (Peters (2014), 116). Yet only a small slice of political science literature has considered the two issues in tandem. Those investigations that do have not considered how the legislative process in US Congress determines which trade and immigration policies ultimately gain support. In this section, we situate our study in the literature on US trade and immigration policy. We highlight key economic and political determinants that form the basis of our hypotheses in Section 3. We discuss how the decisions members of Congress make to sponsor or cosponsor these bills reveal their policy preferences. By looking beyond just bills that went up for a roll call vote—focusing our attention to earlier stages in the legislative process—we aim to uncover the local labor market determinants of policymaking in these intertwined aspects of economic globalization.

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Trade policy carries distributive consequences and produces divergent preferences among domestic stakeholders (Feenstra, 2003). Cleavages may exist between exporter and importer interests, between owners of scarce and abundant factors of production, and between high-skilled and low-skilled workers. Trade policy—both liberalization and protection—creates winners and losers who have an incentive to politically mobilize (Rogowski, 1989; Hiscox, 2002; Baccini, Pinto, and Weymouth, 2017; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001*b*). In the United States, these divergent pressures are thought to affect voter attitudes (Margalit, 2012; Guisinger, 2017; Owen and Johnston, 2017; Mutz and Kim, 2017; Milner and Tingley, 2011), electoral outcomes (Che et al., 2016; Jensen, Quinn, and Weymouth, 2017; Margalit, 2011; Autor et al., 2017; Guisinger, 2009), administrative decisions (Caddel, 2014), and important for our study, Congressional policymaking.

What drives Congressional action on trade policy? A prevalent view is that competition among interest groups steers the course of American trade politics (Grossman and Helpman, 1994; Baldwin and Magee, 2000). Many aspects of trade policy have concentrated costs. For example, liberalization has intensified import competition for US manufacturing. Because of their focused stakes, interest groups overcome collective action problems (Olson, 1971) and lobby their representatives for policies that directly benefit them. Given the distributive consequences of trade policy and the conflicting preferences it generates, then, it is the group that can garner the most political leverage that sways a legislator's vote. If an interest group has many core supporters in a district, that legislator is expected to support the group's preferred trade policies—e.g. targeted protection (Staiger and Tabellini, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 2005). This bears out in the Congressional voting record. Organized special interests have clearly captured legislator attention and influenced votes on landmark trade bills (Milner and Tingley, 2015; Kucik and Moraguez, 2017). Trade policymaking thus reflects the concentrated interests of stakeholders who are best able to politically mobilize.

The American public can also steer Congressional action on trade policy. In theory, trade barriers like import tariffs pass along additional costs to consumers. This implies that the broader public should prefer more liberal trade policy. Some research shows these diffused interests do shape Congressional voting (Bailey, 2001). Senators are more likely cast their roll call votes for free trade bills that advance broader constituent interests when they represent homogeneous states where the distributive conflicts are minor Bailey and Brady (1998).

Whether concentrated or diffused interests dominate depends on political institutions. A common claim in the trade literature is that constituency size is key. Presidents are thought to be less protectionist than Congress while Senators are less so than Representatives. They are more receptive to diffuse interests that are shared across their broad constituencies than locally concentrated ones that tend to favor trade protection. Insofar as different branches of US government lean in different directions on trade policy, it is the strategic interplay between them that dictates trade policy (Lohmann and O'Halloran, 1994; Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast, 1997). Some research has cast doubt on the logic of constituency size and trade policy, however. By evaluating roll call votes on a series of landmark free trade bills Karol (2007) demonstrates intercameral and interbranch gaps are only a recent and contingent phenomenon, far from a truism of US trade politics.

If intercameral divisions are recent and contingent, what then drives trade policy over time? Local economic shocks should affect politics at the Congressional district level. Districts that suffer particularly acute downturns—e.g. Detroit's auto industry in late 1990's—and booms—e.g. Silicon Valley's tech industry in the 2000's—should drive waning and waxing Congressional support for free trade policies. These expectations also bear out in Congressional votes on legislation to compensate "losers" from free trade (Rickard, 2015). Legislators appear responsive to pressures on labor, especially employment vulnerable to off-shoring, when they cast their votes (Owen, 2017). Several studies establish a causal link. The influx in merchandise imports from the "China shock" particularly harmed USmanufacturing. It has lead to a protectionist backlash, driven by legislators representing the districts most acutely harmed (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013a; Feigenbaum and Hall, 2015). It has increased political polarization among constituents (Autor et al., 2017).

We draw on three key insights from the literature. First, trade policy preferences should vary widely across industries and segments of the labor force based on their relative gains or losses from exposure to trade. Second, due to their smaller constituent size, members of the House of Representatives should display greater variation in the trade policies they support than Senators do. To understand how local labor market conditions shape trade policy, we should examine proposed legislation in the House. Third, to gauge the relative importance of concentrated industry interests versus diffused collective interests, we need to consider how bills progress through the legislative process as they secure (or fail to garner) support from different stakeholders.

IMMIGRATION POLICY IN US CONGRESS

Compared to trade policy, scant scholarly attention has been paid to the *economic* dimensions of immigration policy in US Congress.[1] Most political science research on US immigration policy focuses on public opinion rather than the legislative process (e.g., Goldstein and Peters 2014; Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015; Mayda 2006; Scheve and Slaughter 2001*a,b*). This literature has found little evidence that economics drives individual opinions. Rather, partisanship and values shape voters preferences (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015).[2] We limit our focus to the legislative process to understand how local economic factors do or do not translate into immigration policymaking.

Interest groups influence the direction of US immigration policy (Tichenor, 1994; Cornelius and Rosenblum, 2005; Ottaviano, Peri, and Wright, 2013). According to a neoclassical economic logic, the US is a relatively labor-scarce country. Migration inflows lead to falling wages that hurt domestic workers while benefiting owners of land and capital. The former should demand restrictive and latter permissive immigration policy. Consistent with these expectations, labor unions have historically opposed new waves of immigrants (Goldin, 1994; Haus, 1995) although recent decades have brought a shift.[3][4] These expectations are also borne out in lobbying data (Liao, 2015). Facchini, Mayda, and Mishra (2011) use industry-level evidence to show that both pro- and anti-immigration interest groups shape migration policy. Barriers to migration are lower in sectors in which business interest groups lobby most forcefully and higher in sectors where labor unions are dominant. In short, many of the factors that explain interest group influence on trade also apply to immigration policy.

Legislators are swayed not only by lobbying efforts; they are also responsive to local economic and ideological factors.[5] An early analysis of roll call votes in the US Congress shows that members vote on immigration legislation according to district-level economic interests (Gimpel and Edwards, 1999). More recently, Facchini and Steinhardt 2011 reinforce this insight. Using roll call votes,

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[1]We focus on the economic aspects of immigration policy and do not summarize the vast literature on its social, racial and cultural determinants.

[2]An extensive scholarship considers immigration policy in the European Union but it remains unclear whether the lessons can be applied to the American context. Unlike the US, the EU faces serious compliance problems: states sometimes defy European law by restricting the free movement of workers.

[3]The major American labor unions today advocate for more permissive immigration (ex. AFL-CIO's position), although union members may not consistently agree with leadership.

[4]Sometimes farmers advocate permissive immigration policy; other times they have turned a deaf ear to the debate and relied on undocumented workers to fulfill their labor demands.

[5]See Money (1999) for comparisons between the US and other advanced industrialized economies.

they demonstrate that representatives from districts with an abundance of *skilled* labor are more likely to support an open immigration policy towards the unskilled, whereas the opposite is true of representatives from districts with abundant *unskilled* labor. Yet local economic factors cannot be separated from ideological ones. Milner and Tingley (2015) show the left-right ideological spectrum is a strong predictor of roll call voting on immigration policies that deal with redistributive politics and low-skill visa issues in particular. Partisan politics have been pivotal in controlling Congress's immigration agenda (Fennelly, Pearson, and Hackett, 2015). From this literature, we draw the insight that compared to trade policy, immigration policy should have a weaker link to the economy and a stronger tendency toward partisan polarization.

Are Trade and Immigration Policy Co-determined?

Trade and immigration policy are tied through the labor market. Most literature emphasizing this connection comes from economists (Abowd and Freeman, 2007; Dunlevy and Hutchinson, 1999; Hatton and Williamson, 2007). Borjas, Freeman, and Katz (1992) and Borjas et al. (1997) demonstrate that because US immigration toward the end of the last century largely featured low-skilled workers, and because import industries tend to rely on them, the pattern of trade and immigration fits the Heckscher-Ohlin model. According to the model, they are alternative ways of increasing the factor that is relatively scarce in the US compared to the rest of the world—in this case, the small number of lower-skilled native workers (Borjas, Freeman, and Katz 1992, 214). Increased immigration and freer trade have produced a small adverse impact on the low-skilled native workers. But beyond this narrow segment of the labor force, "other regional economic factors dominate the ups and downs of area economies" (Borjas et al. 1997, 3). These studies leave unanswered just how labor market factors fuel trade and immigration policymaking.

Political scientists have begun to examine this connection. Peters (2014, 2015) charts trade policy's effect on the politics of immigration. Trade policy affects the composition of firms in the economy and their need for low-skilled labor. Trade restrictions in the US lead to an increase in production among labor-intensive industries that demands a corresponding increase in the labor supply. Business owners in those industries, in order to keep wages at bay, push for open immigration. Conversely, trade liberalization can heighten market pressures on those same business, causing many to shutter. The political void is quickly filled by anti-immigrant interests driven by social or

racial motives, and leads to a closure in immigration policy. The US is not unique in this experience (Peters, 2017). Research has found rapid increases in trade—specifically import competition—have fueled anti-immigrant politics in the United Kingdom Colatone and Stanig (2016).

We build directly on this literature by uncovering common labor market determinants while offering a novel step forward. Much of the literature relies on Congressional roll call votes to gauge legislator preferences. Doing so implicitly assumes that the trade or immigration bills which receive a roll call vote reflect the range of important prospective policies. Yet the majority party leadership exert their considerable gate-keeping powers to promote bills which align with their policy objectives and overall political strategy. To preserve the appearance of party unity and highlight the divisions between parties, party leaders sometimes move bills to the House floor that exaggerate intra-party differences and minimize intra-party differences. Votes obscure important local economic factors, especially variations that cut across party lines. We look earlier in the legislative process at the sponsorship and cosponsorship of legislation before gate-keeping by party elite takes effect. We assess Congressional support and compare policy preferences at each stage of the legislative process from introduction to passage. This allows us to uncover local economic conditions that shape policy.

Party Support and the Legislative Process

Party support and legislative procedure are indisputably crucial in shaping US policy; trade and immigration are no exception. Previous studies of trade and immigration policy in Congress have focused on the small fraction of bills which receive roll-call votes on the House floor. The majority party in the House of Representatives uses its substantial gate-keeping powers to block legislation that does not align with it's policy goals. They appoint committee chairpeople, schedule bills for floor consideration, and set the rules which govern floor debate and voting. To uncover support for alternative measures, especially policies that highlight divisions within the parties, one needs to look earlier in the legislative process at bill sponsorship—the introduction of legislation—and cosponsorship—the formal endorsement of legislation. There are few restrictions on bill sponsorship and cosponsorship; any legislator may introduce a bill while Congress is in session and any member may copsonsor an introduced bill while it is being considered in committee. Thus, patterns of sponsorship and cosponsorship can uncover US Congressional support for policy in its early stages, before party elite have the opportunity to shape the legislative agenda.

Sponsorship and cosponsorship are meaningful indicators of legislator support (Fowler, 2006). Members sponsor bills to demonstrate their support for an issue (Burstein, Bauldry, and Froese, 2005) and amass a legislative record (Frantzich, 1979), which can aid in fund-raising and elections (Rocca and Gordon, 2010; Lazarus, 2013). MCs dedicate valuable time to sponsorship, because it is a meaningful signal to fellow legislators (Woon, 2008), constituents (Schiller, 1995), and interest groups (Rocca and Gordon, 2010) of their policy position. Likewise, Cosponsorship is a type of position-taking, facilitating the assembly of coalitions in support of introduced legislation (Krehbiel, 1995; Kessler and Krehbiel, 1996). Although cosponsorship requires less investment than sponsorship (Garand and Burke, 2006), legislators rarely vote against the bills they cosponsor (Bernhard and Sulkin, 2013). Cosponsor lists have been used to estimate both the direction (Woon, 2008) and level of support (Koger, 2003) for policy measures within the legislature.

(Co)Sponsorship can be especially valuable activities for legislators who are promoting policies that do not align with majority party goals. Minority-party or ideologically extreme members, and those who do not hold leadership positions invest in bill sponsorship not despite but *because* their bills have little chance of making it through the legislative process to receive a roll call vote (Koger, 2003). To the extent that regional economic factors drive trade and immigration policy, (co)sponsorship patterns are likely to be more sensitive to these effects than roll call votes, especially when these interests cut across party lines. Policy interest and geography have been shown to be stronger predictors of consposorship networks than ideology (Pellegrini and Grant, 1999). (Co)Sponsorship is an important avenue for credit-taking with constituents and interests groups when the likelihood of bill passage is low. For better or worse, (co)sponsorship permanently associates a member with a particular policy position, and legislators expect interest groups and constituents to hold them accountable for this record (Schiller, 1995; Sulkin, 2009). Legislators that (co)sponsor protectionist trade bills associate themselves with the position of pulling the United States back from the global economy. By (co)sponsoring restrictive immigration bills, legislators go on the record as taking a hard stance against foreign workers and permeable borders.

3 Hypotheses and Observable Implications

The literature lends insight into how local economic conditions ought to shape Congressional positions on trade and immigration policy. These preferences are rarely reflected in the tiny subset of bills that advance to receive roll-call votes. Whether legislators craft and promote trade and immigration policy in response to their district economic conditions is only revealed if we look earlier on in the legislative process. By analyzing all stages of the legislative process, from bill introduction to passage, we can uncover cross-cutting cleavages masked by current party politics, but which have the potential to develop over time and usurp the political debate. The so-called China-shock accelerated the loss of manufacturing jobs in the 2000s. To what extent is the current populist political rhetoric on protectionist trade and restrictive immigration policy reflected in earlier legislator sponsorship and cosponsorship patterns?

Based on the literature, we offer two testable hypotheses. First, we posit a **direct economic link** where local labor market conditions induce legislators to support policies which protect and foster industry and workers in their district. *Hypothesis 1: Legislators promote bills to represent the trade and immigration pressures on industries and workers in their districts.*

We test the first hypothesis for each issue area. For trade, we expect that legislators promote protectionist bills when commodity industries within their districts report a negative trade balance. Industry in these districts is least likely to benefit from increased trade exposure. Conversely, we expect that legislators promote liberalizing bills when industries within their districts report a positive trade balance. When an industry is a net exporter, it is likely to benefit from more open trade policies. We weight each industry in a district by its employment to estimate the net trade balance for the entire sector. In the trade context, the interests of industry and labor typically align; increased competition from abroad results in domestic industry and employment loss. If legislators from these districts are responsive to industry and labor interests, a more negative trade balance should be associated with legislators (co)sponsoring trade protection bills. A strong correction provides evidence of Hypothesis 1. Conversely, an insignificant correlation between weighted trade balances and trade policy support would undercut the hypothesis.

Among the commodity industries, which include agriculture, mining and extraction, information and manufacturing, previous research has singled out manufacturing as being the sector most

vulnerable to import competition job loss. We estimate the correlation between the weighted trade balance in manufacturing and legislator sponsorship separately from other commodity industries in order to consider legislator responsiveness to trade pressures on this imperiled sector.

For immigration policy, we test the first hypothesis by focusing on low-skill employment in the local labor market. The policy debate over immigration has centered on the influx of low-skill workers from Mexico and Central America. These workers are most likely to compete with native workers for jobs which require the least levels of education, training and language skills. In the context of immigration policy, the interests of industry and native labor typically do not align; firms which employ low-skill workers benefit from the increased supply of immigrant workers, driving wages downward for native workers in these occupations. If legislators from these districts are responsive to native labor interests, more low-skill employment should be associated with legislators (co)sponsoring restrictive bills. On the other hand, if legislators from these districts are responsive to industry interests, more low-skill employment should be associated with legislators (co)sponsoring permissive bills. Both correlations are evidence of hypothesis 1–a direct economic link between local labor market conditions and policymaking. The former, however, is consistent with a "protecting native jobs" rationale. A null finding for these variables, on the other hand, undercuts the direct link argument with respect to immigration policy.

Second, we posit an **indirect partisan link** where local economic conditions produce polarized, partisan responses by Democrat and Republican legislators. *Hypothesis 2: Legislator responses to local economic conditions, when promoting trade and immigration bills, depends on that legislator's political party.*

To test the indirect partisan link, we investigate whether the relationship between district economic conditions and policy direction depends on the (co)sponsor's party. Autor et al. (2017) find that the loss of manufacturing jobs, as a result of import competition, caused Republican and Democrat districts to elect more extreme candidates. The question is whether these legislators, once in Congress, *more actively* pursue polarized trade agendas which reinforce partisan divisions. For example, Democratic legislators who represent districts with significant employment in a trade-vulnerable industry could respond by bearing down on their traditional party position of trade protection. They might argue that policy needs to be targeted to help these vulnerable workers. By contrast, when Republican legislators represent districts with similar conditions, they could respond

by emphasizing their traditional party position of liberalization. They might argue that freer trade removes problematic barriers to commerce, allowing the market to work more effectively. Similarly, legislators from districts that disproportionately employ low-skill workers could *more actively* promote immigration policies which align with their party's traditional position.

Legislators have policy preferences on the full range of issues that come before Congress, however, they have limited time and resources and must select which policies on which to focus their energy. More so than roll call votes, where participation is strongly encouraged, the decision to (co)sponsor any specific bill represents a choice by legislators wishing to take an active position on a policy. To test the second hypothesis, we consider whether Republican legislators from districts impacted by trade and immigration are more likely to cosponsor liberalizing trade and restrictive immigration bills compared to other Republicans. Similarly, we consider whether Democratic legislators from impacted districts are more likely to cosponsor protective trade and permissive immigration bills compared to other Democrats. An opposite signed correlation for Republican and Democrats between impacted districts and the likelihood of cosponsoring bills lends support to Hypothesis 2. If the correlation for Republican and Democrats is same-signed—both Republican and Democratic districts respond to local economic conditions by cosponsoring similar types of bills—or if there is no correlation, the results undercut Hypothesis 2.

Several mechanisms can explain why we may observe a direct and/or indirect partisan relationship between local economic conditions and bill (co)sponsorship. On the one hand, economic and partisan factors may produce policies in the predicted ways. On the other hand, there may be unobserved legislator and district characteristics that are responsible for the correlations in our analysis. Thus we emphasize that the relationships in our analysis are not causal effects; they only provide evidence that is or is not consistent with the paper's hypotheses. More pointedly, our analysis of hypothesis 1 cannot differentiate between two causal pathways. Legislators could be changing preferences in response to district economic conditions or districts could be electing legislators with policy positions that best represent their interests. With respect to hypothesis 2, it is possible that Republican and Democratic legislators differ in their policy response to local economic conditions and yet these differences may reflect unobserved district characteristics or a polarized, partisan response among voters or legislators. For example, if we find that Republican districts with large manufacturing employment support liberalizing trade bills while Democrats from similar districts

do not, it may be that the types of manufacturing industries found in Republican and Democratic-led districts differ (and are differentially impacted by trade policy), or that voters in these districts polarize in response to economic stressors, or that legislators more actively promote policy agendas that are consistent with their own partisan and ideological preferences. The data set disclosed in this paper contains a rich set of variables which can be used to further investigate and distinguish between these scenarios in future analyses.

4   A New Dataset on Trade and Immigration Bills

How do regional economic conditions and Congressional politics guide US policy on trade and immigration? To understand the determinants, we created a novel data set on trade and immigration legislation. Our data includes all trade and immigration bills introduced to the US House of Representatives from the 109th to 114th Congress, spanning the years 2005 to 2016. The period encompasses two presidencies, divided and unified Congresses, and importantly, the 2008 Great Recession, which is widely thought to have triggered the recent anti-globalism backlash. We observe all legislative action associated with each bill including sponsorship, cosponsorship, committee and subcommittee action, and roll-call votes, and connect this activity to the legislators responsible for these actions.

We focus on the House, as opposed to the Senate, because the former should be more responsive to local economic interests (Olson, 1971; Persson and Tabellini, 2002). The House's smaller constituencies tend to produce more homogeneous districts. And there is wide variation between House districts in how they have been impacted by economic globalization. We therefore expect meaningful variation in the trade and immigration bills proposed in the House. By contrast, Senate bills are likely to reflect state-wide heterogeneous economies that differ less from one another.

To understand how district factors influence bill support, we linked this Congressional data to information on legislator ideology and district-level characteristics about the labor force including occupation, industry employment, and industry trade balance. We draw on data from multiple US government agencies, including the Census, the Bureau of Labor Statistics and the International Trade Commission. We discuss each component in turn.

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Our data on trade and immigration legislation is initially drawn from the the US Library of Congress online archive, congress.gov which we gathered with web-scraping tools. We recorded all bills introduced in the House between the 109th and 114th Congress and listed under the subject headings "foreign trade and international finance" and "immigration," relying on Congressional subject categories to ensure unbiased classifications.[6] For each bill, we recorded the sponsor, cosponsors, title, bill text, and action history. There were 3356 trade and 965 immigration bills introduced during the period. Table 1 summarizes these bills and provides background information on the presidency and partisan control of each Congress.

Table 1: Political Context and Number of Immigration and Trade Bills Sponsored in USHouse of Representatives, 109th - 114th Congresses

	CONGRESS						
	109th	110th	111th	112th	113th	114th	*total*
YEARS	2005-6	2007-8	2009-10	2011-12	2013-14	2015-16	
PRESIDENT	Bush	Bush	Obama	Obama	Obama	Obama	
SENATE MAJORITY	R	D	D	D	D	R	
HOUSE MAJORITY	R	D	D	R	R	R	
TRADE BILLS	810	888	130	1374	78	76	*3356*
IMMIGRATION BILLS	177	173	133	138	137	207	*965*

Note: Data collected from Library of Congress.

Next, we determined the policy position of each bill. We classified trade legislation as liberalizing or protectionist (coded as -1, 1) depending on whether its provisions would in net reduce or raise barriers to trade. Immigration legislation was classified as restrictive or permissive (coded as -1, 1) depending on whether its provisions would in net increase or reduce the numbers of individuals immigrating to the US on an annual basis. Legislation that would not increase or decrease net trade or immigration levels or have effects orthogonal to these dimensions were labeled neutral (coded as 0).[7] This categorization is well-suited for trade and immigration legislation, where a single

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[6]Some other bills could carry indirect consequences for trade and immigration; yet identifying those bills as such would introduce subjective assessments and potentially bias the data.

[7]Neutral bills included changes to trade adjustment assistance, a program to help workers negatively impacted by import competition, as well as legislation to increase the number of visas for immigrants with advanced degrees in science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM) by reducing visas in other programs.

dimension captures the bill's policy position with reasonable accuracy. Throughout the paper, we exclude neutral bills from the analysis.

Classifying the bills was not trivial. With the help of research assistants, we read through and categorized all 3356 trade and 965 immigration bills in the sample. Working independently, the research assistants coded each bill, judging policy content based solely on the bill summary and text. They were instructed not to use any information relating to the bill's sponsor, cosponsors, or action history to ensure that our measure of policy content was independent of confounding factors. The two coders had 92 percent agreement. We reviewed each instance of disagreement to reach a final decision on policy content, noting the reason for our determination. To our knowledge, this data set is the most comprehensive record of US trade and immigration bills to date.

Legislator action

We recorded each bill's progress through the legislature to construct an action history. We flagged four key stages in the legislative process: introduction, whether the bill passed out of at least one committee or subcommittee, whether it received a vote on the House floor and whether the bill became public law. For each stage in the legislative process, we compiled information about members and their actions taken with respect to each bill, including whether or not they were a bill sponsor or cosponsor and their roll call votes.

We matched bill sponsor and cosponsor lists to the official committee and subcommittee assignment lists prepared by the Office of the House Clerk.[8] We implemented automated text extraction, processed and paired these memberships with the sponsors supporting and committees overseeing each bill. This information identifies whether the (co)sponsor served on one of the bill's assigned committees, their rank on that committee, and whether they held a key gatekeeping role within the legislature. Gatekeepers include chairman and ranking members of the bill's assigned committee(s) and House majority and minority party leaders. These individuals have considerable power to determine which bills are reported out of committee and receive consideration on the House floor. For example, all bills in the dataset that were scheduled for a vote on the House floor passed the House; an indication of the considerable power the Speaker of the House wields over the policy agenda.

Where we examine roll call votes, we drew on data from the Propublica API. We focus on the

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[8]E.g. "Final Edition List of Standing Committees and Select Committees and their Subcommittees of the House of Representatives of the United States, One Hundred Tenth Congress" January 3rd 2009.

votes associated with House passage, including votes held under suspension of the rules but not including motions to recommit.[9] Once a bill passes the House and Senate, the chambers must resolve any differences between the bills before legislation is sent to the President for signature—we do not analyze roll call votes associated with this final stage since such an analysis would require data on Senate legislative actions and history.

For all members, we record the (co)sponsor's DW-NOMINATE scores from Lewis et al. (2019) to account for the legislator's ideology across the full scope of policy issues on which he or she casts a vote.[10] We then link all member institution and action data to district-level economic and demographic characteristics.

DISTRICT-LEVEL CHARACTERISTICS

The dataset includes a variety of labor market measures to capture the effects of more open markets and borders on regional domestic economies. We constructed district-level estimates from the US Census American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) files by averaging Census area estimates across Congressional districts weighted by the proportion of the Census population residing within the district. We relied on the Master Area Block Level Equivalency (MABLE) geographic database at the Missouri Census Data Center for the population weights for each Congress. The first year of each Congress is used. For example, we match the 2005 1-Year ACS PUMS file to the 104th Congress (2005-2006).

In this paper, we focus on employment in industries and occupations that are most affected by trade and immigration. Trade policy has had concentrated effects for industries which produce commodity goods, especially the manufacturing sector. In general, industries that are net exporters to other countries have benefited, while those that are net importers have been harmed by the passage of free trade agreements. Using the Census North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes, we link industry employment to the trade balance in goods data from the International Trade Commission (ITC). The average trade balance across manufacturing and other commodity industries is weighted by employment in each industry at the district-level. This gives us an estimate of whether a district is a net importer or net exporter. In our regression analysis, we

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[9] All bills that received consideration on the House floor ultimately passed the House.

[10] Legislators' DW-Nominate scores are based on the record of all roll call votes taken over their entire tenure in office. Legislators cast thousands of votes during their careers; the effect of a single roll call vote on a legislator's DW-Nominate score is trivial.

focus on each district's total weighted trade balance and its manufacturing weighted trade balance.

Immigration, particularly immigration from Mexico and Central America, primarily impacts the labor market for low-skill jobs since many immigrants from these countries arrive with minimal English language skills and education. The U.S. Department of Labor classifies occupations according to education, training and experience requirements. We matched occupation codes to the Standard Occupational Classification codes in the U.S. Census to calculate employment within each occupation zone. Occupation zone 1 includes jobs that do not require a high school degree, English fluency or on-the-job experience and training; these are the jobs in which low-skill immigrants are most likely to find employment.

For both trade and immigration, we separately account for employment in the three most concentrated industries. Manufacturing, entertainment and professional and financial services are the industries with the largest employment share at the district level every year between 2004 and 2016 in the U.S. Census data. These are key service industries that are labor intensive and span a range of skill levels. Again, we use the NAICS industry classifications to categorize firms by industry.

Trade policy has arguably had the greatest impact on manufacturing compared to other industries. Economic studies earlier discussed estimate that the shift towards liberalization resulted in the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs. In comparison, immigration policy is most likely to impact employment in the entertainment sector, which includes restaurants, leisure and hospitality service workers. Entertainment sector employment is the industry most correlated with occupation zone 1 in the data, an indication that this industry disproportionately relies on a low-skill labor force. We expect that legislators who represent manufacturing districts to be more active on trade policy, while those who represent districts with entertainment-based economies to be more active on immigration policy. The direction in which legislators from impacted districts promote trade and immigrant policy depends on whether there is a direct economic or indirect partisan link.

As the industry representing middle and upper class workers, the professional and financial sector is least likely to be directly impacted by trade and immigration policy. Workers in this industry require significant education, and thus they are unlikely to compete for jobs with low-skill immigrants. In addition, the services rendered by professional and financial workers are in many cases person-to-person and thus at lower risk of being shipped offshore. Rather, the people working in the professional and financial services sector are most likely to benefit from the positive effects

of more open trade and immigration boarders. They have lower unemployment rates compared to lower-skill workers and are less likely to experience spells of unemployment. One would expect trade and immigration shocks to have a relatively small effect on them.

In addition, we include employment in agriculture, a critical American industry that has been directly impacted by trade and immigration policies. A net exporter, agricultural business has largely benefited from America's free trade agreements. Farms also depend on migrant workers to plant and harvest crops and raise and process livestock, and thus benefit from less restrictive immigration policies. We expect legislators from districts with significant employment in agriculture to be active on both trade and immigration policy. Again, they may chose to support policies which align with their direct economic interest or with their partisan interests depending on how economic pressures translate into policy action.

5 Bill Sponsorship and the Local Economy

We take our hypotheses to the data and find that the policy content of trade and immigration bills proposed in each Congress decidedly reflect the sponsor's party affiliation and economic conditions in the district he or she represents.[11] For trade, there is strong evidence of a direct link employment pressures and the bills legislators choose to (co)sponsor. Economic conditions are also weakly predictive of immigration bills, although partisanship appears to exert a stronger influence.

The first striking pattern is that legislators are more polarized on the issue of immigration than trade. Figure 1 plots the mean policy content for the bills in our dataset over time, disaggregated by the bill sponsor's party. Both parties have sponsored a range of trade bills but it is clear that sponsorship patterns reflect party platforms. Democrats usually introduce more trade protection bills and Republicans more liberalizing bills. For clarity, we exclude from this plot the numerous narrow bills that adjust duty rates on specific products, discussed below.[12] Trade policy proposals have shifted in a protectionist direction in the most recent years with a growing partisan gap. Immigration policy, by contrast, has long been starkly divided along party lines. Democrats almost exclusively sponsor permissive immigration bills; Republicans usually support restrictions. Both

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[11]We exclude neutral bills in order to distinguish a moderate policy agenda where legislators support both restrictive and permissive immigration legislation, for example, from the support of neutral legislation.

[12]Duty bills are almost always liberalizing and were mostly used—by both parties—in the 112th Congress.

parties have moved slightly in the more restrictive direction recently.

Figure 1: Mean Policy Content of Trade and Immigration Legislation, 109th - 114th Congress

(a) Trade (Excluding Duty Adjustments)   (b) Immigration

Sponsorship Patterns

There are more than three times the number of trade bills than immigration bills in the data set. This reflects the presence of a certain type of bill, which is unique to the issue of trade. Over 75% of trade bills in the data set include provisions for temporary adjustments to tariffs on imported products, primarily chemicals, raw materials and other goods required for manufacturing. These bills were part of a now defunct process for amending the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. At the request of industry, legislators would sponsor bills to adjust duties on certain goods. The House Ways and Means Committee would incorporate the provisions of these duty-adjustment bills into a larger omnibus trade bills referred to as Miscellaneous Tariff Bills (CRS Report, 2012). There are 2617 duty adjustment bills; all but six reduce or suspend tariffs on goods and therefore are coded as liberalizing. Every legislator has an incentive to sponsor these bills, regardless of their overall position on trade policy for the same reasons that legislators sponsor pork barrel spending bills. In the analysis that follows, we sometimes omit these duty bills, since their inclusion can obscure meaningful divisions on trade policy.

Figures 2 shows histograms of trade and immigration bills sponsored in each Congress by the

sponsor's first dimension DW-Nominate score. This is the dimension widely-used to summarize liberal and conservative division on economic issues. A positive one (1) DW-Nominate score denotes a consistently conservative voting record while a negative one (-1) denotes a consistently liberal voting record across the vast range of issues raised in Congress. The colors indicate the mean policy content of legislation in each bin.

The trade policy positions of Democrats and Republicans vary over time (Figure 2(a)). The majority of trade bills were introduced during the 109th, 110th and 112th Congresses. During this period, Congress debated several major free trade agreements. The 109th Congress passed the Central American Free Trade Agreement. The 110th Congress passed the U.S.-Peru Trade Promotion Act, and the House passed the U.S.-Colombia Trade Agreement though progress stalled in the Senate. During the 112th Congress, legislators sponsored more than 1300 bills and passed into law three bilateral trade deals with Korea, Colombia, and Panama respectively. Thus, the first four Congress saw a successful bipartisan effort to pass liberalizing trade policies. Partisan politics, however, emerges over time to disrupt further progress towards liberalization. Preoccupied with the 2008 presidential election, the 111th Congress delayed consideration of the US-Colombia Free Trade Agreement. In the 113th and 114th Congresses, negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and executive fast-track authority collapsed under partisan politics.[13] Thus, we observe a growing divide between Republicans and Democrats on trade, which becomes clearly evident in the 113th and 114th Congresses.

For immigration there is significant polarization throughout the period (Figure 2(b)). Ideology is strongly correlated with immigration policy position: the more conservative the legislator, the more likely they are to support restrictive immigration legislation. All efforts to pass major immigration reform failed during this time. Notably, President Bush failed twice to pass his comprehensive immigration reform bill through the 109th and the 110th Congresses (CRS Report Overall). The 114th House under Republican leadership passed several bills to strengthen border security and visa requirements (CRS Report on 114th Congress); none passed the Senate to become public law.

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[13]The only notable legislation to pass during this period is the American Manufacturing Competitiveness Act which reformed the process for amended the Harmonized Tariff Schedule. The bill ended the practice of legislators sponsoring bills to adjust duties on specific industries. Companies now submit requests to the ITC, who prepares a comprehensive list of adjustments for Congress to approve.

Figure 2: Policy Positions of Trade and Immigration Bills by Sponsor's Nominate Score

(a) Trade Bills Introduced in the 109th, 110th, 111th, 112th, 113th & 114th Congresses

(b) Immigration Bills Introduced in the 109th, 110th, 111th 112th, 113th & 114th Congresses

Note: Figures exclude duty adjustment bills. Blue text denotes Democrat-majority Houses and red text denotes Republican-majority Houses.

With these patterns in mind, we turn to our first hypothesis. We posited a direct economic link between the labor market conditions in a sponsor's district and the direction of the sponsor's trade and immigration bills. Under the first hypothesis, the weighted trade balance for manufacturing and non-manufacturing commodity industries should be negatively associated the direction of trade policy; the larger the deficit the more likely legislators sponsor protectionist legislation. This prediction holds regardless of whether a legislator is responsive to firm or labor interests, since these interest tend to align on trade policy. With respect to immigration, we proposed that legislators from districts with greater shares of low-skill workers are likely to favor more restrictive bills if these legislators are primarily concerned about labor competition between native and immigrant workers. This result would be consistent with populist messages which argue that stricter borders are needed to protect American jobs and keep wages high. Firms that employ low-skill workers, however, have an incentive to lobby their representatives for more permissive immigration policies. Thus, either a negative or positive correlation between higher levels of occupation zone 1 employment and the direction of immigration bills would provide evidence for a direct economic link. The association, however, must be in the same direction for both Republican and Democratic legislators.

Table 2 presents regression results using the sponsor data and a series of simple linear models. The unit of analysis is the bill with trade and immigration bills tested in separate regressions. We report standard errors clustered by congress-district because some legislators introduce several bills in a single Congress and their district characteristics are observed multiple times. We include control variables for whether a sponsor is holds a gate-keeping position, whether the sponsor is a member of the majority party, and the log mean income and employment rate in the sponsor's district.

Table 2: Linear Regression of Policy Content of Trade and Immigration Legislation on District Characteristics, $109^{th} - 114^{th}$ Congress

	Trade			Trade (Non-Duty)			Immigration		
	Protectionist = 1 Liberalizing = -1			Protectionist = 1 Liberalizing = -1			Permissive = 1 Restrictive = -1		
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(1C)	(2C)	(3C)
Democratic Sponsor	0.740*	0.151***	0.150***	0.740*	0.753***	0.758***	−0.023	1.121***	1.116***
	(0.305)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.305)	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.211)	(0.071)	(0.071)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	−0.039			−0.039			−1.267***		
	(0.374)			(0.374)			(0.219)		
DW Nominate Dim. 2	−0.267			−0.267			−0.666***		
	(0.220)			(0.220)			(0.109)		
Manufacturing Trade Balance†		−0.056**	−0.034		−0.098**	−0.072			
		(0.017)	(0.021)		(0.035)	(0.050)			
× Democrat			−0.039			−0.043			
			(0.035)			(0.067)			
Non-Manufacturing Trade Balance†		−0.034*	−0.032*		−0.042	−0.130*			
		(0.013)	(0.016)		(0.069)	(0.058)			
× Democrat			0.001			0.157			
			(0.026)			(0.112)			
Occupation Zone 1†								0.113***	0.165*
								(0.033)	(0.065)
× Democrat									−0.078
									(0.066)
Constant	−0.747***	−0.985***	−0.983***	−0.747***	−0.791***	−0.775***	0.124	−0.468***	−0.456***
	(0.183)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.183)	(0.098)	(0.097)	(0.128)	(0.075)	(0.076)
Bills	3,205	3,205	3,205	588	588	588	910	910	910
Sponsors	325	325	325	203	203	203	314	314	314
R^2	0.04	0.06	0.06	0.17	0.19	0.2	0.43	0.36	0.36

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district.
† Normalized.*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

Table 2 reports the results for all trade bills, trade bills excluding duty-adjustment bills, and immigration bills. Since the duty-adjustment bills are introduced with the intention of amending the Harmonized Tariff Schedule, as explained above, it makes sense to exclude them since they overwhelm the data and do not represent meaningful efforts at new policymaking. However, for transparency purposes, we report the results for trade with and without the duty-adjustment bills.

As expected, a clear partisan divide on trade emerges when we exclude duty-adjustment bills which are almost always liberalizing. The intercept and Democratic sponsor terms for models 1B, 2B and 3B indicate that conditional on economic conditions, Republicans sponsor approximately seven liberalizing trade bills for every protectionist bill while Democrats sponsor equal numbers of both types of bills. We find evidence that supports a direct economic link between the weighted trade balance and the direction of trade bills. The main effect for the manufacturing trade balance in both the duty and non-duty trade bill regressions is large and highly significant in model 2B. Legislators representing places where residents are employed in trade-deficit industries are by far the most likely to propose trade protection bills regardless of whether they are Republican or Democrat. The correlation is strengthened when we focus on non-duty bills, which tend to cover multiple products and issues rather than narrowly targeted adjustments to tariff rates. Manufacturing has borne an especially acute burden from economic globalization and this pressure appears to have encouraged legislators to advocate for trade protection.

For immigration bills, we find additional support for the direct economic link between occupation zone 1 employment and bill direction. In addition to a sizable main effect of party, the results for immigration bill sponsorship in models 2C and 3C indicate that legislators from districts that employ larger numbers of low-skill workers are more likely to sponsor permissive trade bills regardless of party. Clearly, Republicans and Democrats are divided on the issue of immigration and Table 2 dispels the idea that efforts to restrict immigration are driven by grievances over job competition. When the bulk of a district's workforce is employed in low-skilled occupations, its legislator is more likely to support *permissive* – not restrictive – immigration bills.[14] This is precisely the opposite correlation than we would expect to see if immigration restrictions were designed to protect the most vulnerable native workers from competition with immigrant workers for limited jobs.

Table 2 confirms the strong role of party identification for both trade and immigration pol-

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[14]Low-skill occupation employment percentage is inversely correlated with district mean income ($\rho = -0.79$).

icy. Democrats consistently sponsor protectionist trade and permissive immigration bills in line with their party platforms. Partisanship is far more pronounced for immigration than it is for trade. While partisanship matters for trade, Democratic legislators conditional on the local economy sponsor both liberalizing and protectionist trade bills. But our results are suggest that local labor market conditions lead legislators to occasionally stray from their party platforms. Thus we find clear support for Hypothesis 1 for both issues. At the proposal stage, legislators sponsor bills that reflect the economic pressures faced by the workforce in their districts.

We repeat the preceding analysis using each bill's cosponsors in lieu of the sponsor. Results are presented in the Appendix Table A.1. In addition to aforementioned control variables, we include the number of cosponsors, examining only bills that attracted support from at least one cosponsor. We find similar patterns, albeit with minor differences. Overall, cosponsorship results reinforce the sponsorship results and support hypothesis 1. The same conditions that lead a legislator to sponsor a bill—a strong stand on policy position—apply to cosponsorship—a somewhat weaker stand on policy position.[15] Early in a bill's life, both forms of support reveal local economic origins of trade policy and partisan divisions on immigration policy.

6 Cosponsorship and Partisan Divisions

Once a bill has been introduced, it is carried through a leaky pipeline. At each stage of the legislative process, many bills are blocked and discarded; a tiny minority advance far enough to receive a vote that might convert the bill into public law. Previous studies have emphasized the importance of roll call votes to understand policy support. On the one hand, it is sensible to focus on bills that progress far enough through the legislative process to have a fair shot at becoming law. On the other hand, focusing exclusively on bills receiving a roll call vote yields a fragmented picture of the pressures shaping trade and immigration policy.

There are two reasons to look at all trade and immigration bills. First, too few bills receive roll call votes to conduct an analysis of their policy positions. Only a handful of bills make it out of Committee to receive consideration on the House floor; only a small portion of those receive a roll call vote on the question of House passage. Less controversial bills often are agreed to by voice vote

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[15]Many trade bills target a single industry, attract no cosponsors, and are excluded from the analysis.

and the positions of each legislator on passage go unrecorded.

Figure 3 compares the mean policy content of introduced bills to those which received roll call votes on the question of house passage by party of the bill sponsor for each Congress. The transparent points, connected by lines, represent all introduced legislation, while the dark opaque points represent the subset of bills which received roll call votes. The area of each point is proportionate to the number of bills it represents. In most Congresses, only one party has legislation that progressed to receive a roll call vote, typically the majority party. Some years there are no bills within a policy area that received roll call votes. This figure makes clear that it would be impossible to compare the policy position of Republican versus Democratic-sponsored bills by analyzing just the fraction which received roll call votes.

Figure 3: Mean Policy Position of Introduced Legislation and Legislation Receiving Roll Call Votes by Sponsor's Party and Congress

(a) Trade (Excluding Duty Adj.)

(b) Immigration

Note: Transparent circles show the mean policy position of introduced legislation by party of the sponsor; blue for Democrat and red for Republican sponsors. Opaque circles show the mean policy position of legislation that received a roll call vote by party of the sponsor. Circle areas are proportionate to the number of bills.

The second reason that we look beyond roll call votes is that this limited sample cannot adjudi-

cate between local economic and partisan determinants of policy. By virtue of making it to the vote stage, a bill must garner significant support from party leadership. This limited sample obscures patterns that would link local economic conditions to the direction of trade and immigration policy. By expanding the sample to include all introduced legislation, we uncover patterns in the policy preferences of legislators over time and with respect to geographically–varied economic factors. For instance, Democrats and Republicans are polarized with respect to immigration and much less so on the issue of trade. Polarization on trade emerges in the 113th and 114th Congresses. And yet had we looked exclusively at bills receiving roll call votes, we would miss this temporal trend.

Comparing introduced and House-passed legislation reveals how forcefully gate-keepers control the policy agenda. The majority leader exercises power by selecting which bills to shepherd through the legislative process. With the exception of the 112th Congress on trade, all bills that received roll call votes were sponsored by majority-party members. Generally speaking the more intra-party conflict on a policy issue, the more the policy position of introduced bills differs from that of bills receiving roll call votes.

For Democratic-sponsored legislation, there are only small differences in the mean policy position of bills introduced versus those receiving roll call votes. For Republican-sponsored immigration bills the differences in policy content is quite striking. Eleven of the twelve Republican sponsored-immigration bills to receive a roll call vote pushed policy in a restrictive direction. But these bills were not representative of the bills proposed by Representatives. A quarter of Republican-sponsored legislation was permissive on immigration with the exception of the 114th Congress where the mean policy position of Republican-sponsored legislation shifts abruptly more restrictive.

On trade bills sponsored by Republicans, the mean policy position of introduced bills is generally similar to those receiving roll call votes. This suggests there is less variation in preferences within the Republican party on this issue. The bills that received roll call votes in the 112th Congress were more protectionist than those introduced. Of the four bills that received roll call votes in that Congress, all were Republican-sponsored bills and two were protectionist. In short, bills receiving roll call votes reflect the outcome of partisan discipline and focusing on them would miss variation within the parties and across the issues.

With that justification in mind, we turn to our second hypothesis. H2 posits an indirect link where the effect of economic conditions on policy direction is *conditional* on the legislator's party.

When confronted with given local economic conditions in his or her district, we expect that a Republican legislator will support more liberal trade policy than a Democrat would. Likewise, encountering the same district factors, a Republican legislator will support more restrictive immigration policy than a Democrat would.

What fuels a legislator's decision to cosponsor or not? We evaluate empirical support for the second hypothesis by looking at cosponsorship activity. While many bills have no or only a few co-sponsors, a few noteworthy bills draw widespread support. We account for the partisan composition of co-sponsorship, account for the (sub)committees overseeing the bills, and identify party gatekeepers. About 70 per cent of the bills receive no co-sponsorship, 23 percent attract between one and twenty cosponsors, and approximately three per cent gain broad support from fifty or more cosponsors. Slightly over half of the bills receiving any co-sponsorship were bipartisan (682 bipartisan co-sponsored versus 613 single-party co-sponsored bills). Bills sponsored by Democrats were more likely to receive bipartisan support (357 bipartisan versus 250 Democrat-only). Conversely, bills sponsored by Republicans were less likely to receive bipartisan support (324 bipartisan versus 363 Republican-only). Bipartisanship is decreasing over the period: the 110th Congress featured the most bipartisan co-sponsorship whereas the 114th had the least.

We consider the joint economic and political determinants of a legislator's cosponsorship decisions. We evaluate whether district industry and occupation variables predict a legislator's decision to cosponsor (or not) each category of bills. Recall there are four policy positions captured in our dataset: trade protection, trade liberalization, permissive immigration, and restrictive immigration. We run separate linear regressions[16] for each category, with the outcome variable representing each member of congress's decision to cosponsor (1) or not (0). The analysis is organized to distinguish between direct partisan and/or economic effects, on the one hand, and indirect economic effects that produce polarized partisan responses, on the other. A strong interaction effect suggests that economic shocks produce different responses depending on whether the cosponsor is a Democrat or Republican. We interpret such results as tentative support for the indirect partisan link (H2).

Each model includes controls for institutional predictors of cosponsorship, whether the cosponsor is of the same party as the sponsor, whether the sponsor is a member of the majority party or holds

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[16]Linear regression is preferred over logistic regression as it requires weaker assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2008), however we performed the analysis using both methods and find comparable results.

a key gate-keeping position, and the number of cosponsors on the bill. In addition, all models include indicators of the overall economy within the district as above. We cluster standard errors by congress-district for all regressions.

Table 3 reports the results for trade protection (A) and liberalizing (B) bills. As a baseline for comparison, we regress the decision to cosponsor on DW-Nominate scores for the first and second dimension. The results are shown in model 1 under each bill type. Partisanship and ideology are strong predictors of cosponsorship for trade permissive bills but not trade liberalizing bills. Both Republicans and Democrats, regardless of ideology, cosponsor trade liberalizing bills at equal rates. Model 2 focuses on the trade balance for commodity industries in the district weighted by employment for those industries, while model 4 focuses on employment in key industries. Models 3 and 5 report the interaction of these explanatory variables with the party of the cosponsor.

When districts have a negative industry trade balance, Democrat representatives are more willing to cosponsor trade protection legislation; Republicans representing similar districts are not. This is precisely what we expect. When a district suffers from import competition, Democrats bear down on their traditional platform and support import restrictions (e.g. higher tariffs, technical barriers). Republicans are on average unresponsive: they are no more likely to stray from their traditional liberalization platform. Conversely, in models 2B and 3B, trade balance is not associated with cosponsorship of trade liberalization bills. This correlation is consistent with a theory of trade politics that focuses on mobilization. Constituents in districts that enjoy a positive trade balance and conceivably benefit from further trade liberalization might fail to press their politicians to support free(r) trade policies. Our findings are consistent with the conventional wisdom that protectionist interests are better than pro-liberalization interests at demanding trade policies that help them.

We can compare this result to those for manufacturing employment in models 4 and 5. Manufacturing industries report an overall negative trade balance during this period, although there is variation among firms within the industry. We find that both Republican and Democrats from districts with larger employment in manufacturing are more likely than other members of their party to cosponsor trade protection bills, although the association is twice as strong for Democrats. The results for trade balance and manufacturing employment indicate that trade exposure does appear to shape legislator preferences. It remains ambiguous whether the response is partisan or not.

There is strong evidence of partisan effects for trade liberalizing bills for legislators who represent

certain types of districts. While Democrats and Republicans cosponsor trade liberalization bills at equal rates overall, Republicans from districts with larger employment in the manufacturing and professional/financial sectors cosponsor these bills at higher rates than Democrats from these districts as well as other Republicans. Both industries are directly impacted by trade policy, which may explain why Republicans from these districts cosponsor trade liberalizing bills at higher rates. Even though white collar workers have benefited overall from more open trade policies while blue collar workers have not, there is significant variation within these industry categories in how firms have weathered globalization. It is possible that the increased likelihood of Republicans from these districts to cosponsor trade liberalization bills represents a polarized response whereby economic shocks prompt legislators to actively promote policies that are consistent with their own party's position. It is also possible that these legislators tend to be elected from districts that represent firms, including manufacturing firms, that have benefited from more open trade policies.

Table 3: Linear Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Trade Bills (Non-Duty) on District Characteristics, $109^{th} - 114^{th}$ Congress

	Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Trade Bill?									
	(A) Protectionist					(B) Liberalizing				
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)
Democratic Cosponsor	−0.018** (0.006)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)	0.0004 (0.001)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	−0.056*** (0.006)					−0.003 (0.002)				
DW Nominate Dim. 2	0.002 (0.004)					−0.002 (0.001)				
Trade Balance†		−0.003** (0.001)	0.0005 (0.001)				−0.0003 (0.0003)	0.00002 (0.0004)		
× Democrat			−0.007*** (0.002)					−0.001 (0.001)		
Agriculture†				−0.004*** (0.001)	−0.003** (0.001)				0.0001 (0.0003)	0.001 (0.0005)
× Democrat					−0.002 (0.002)					−0.002* (0.001)
Manufacturing†				0.007*** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)				0.001* (0.0004)	0.002*** (0.0005)
× Democrat					0.006* (0.003)					−0.003*** (0.001)
Entertainment†				−0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)				0.0005 (0.0003)	0.0001 (0.0004)
× Democrat					0.001 (0.002)					0.001 (0.001)
Professional and Financial†				−0.004* (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)				0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
× Democrat					−0.004 (0.002)					−0.002* (0.001)
Constant	−0.004 (0.003)	−0.030*** (0.001)	−0.030*** (0.001)	−0.031*** (0.001)	−0.031*** (0.001)	−0.002 (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.003*** (0.001)
N	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	81,301	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727	168,727
Bills	191	191	191	191	191	397	397	397	397	397
Legislators	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797
R^2	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.22	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. † Normalized. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

Table 4: Linear Regression of Decision to Cosponsor Immigration Bills on District Characteristics, $109^{th} - 114^{th}$ Congress

	(A) Permissive					(B) Restrictive				
	(1A)	(2A)	(3A)	(4A)	(5A)	(1B)	(2B)	(3B)	(4B)	(5B)
Democratic Cosponsor	−0.042*** (0.004)	0.029*** (0.001)	0.030*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.026*** (0.001)	0.059*** (0.007)	−0.033*** (0.002)	−0.033*** (0.002)	−0.036*** (0.002)	−0.035*** (0.002)
DW Nominate Dim. 1	−0.086*** (0.005)					0.111*** (0.008)				
DW Nominate Dim. 2	−0.042*** (0.003)					0.002 (0.004)				
Occupation Zone 1†		0.005*** (0.001)	0.0002 (0.001)				−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.008** (0.002)		
× Democrat			0.007*** (0.001)					0.007** (0.002)		
Agriculture†				0.002* (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)				−0.003*** (0.001)	−0.006*** (0.001)
× Democrat					0.001 (0.002)					0.006*** (0.002)
Manufacturing†				0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)				0.0003 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.002)
× Democrat					−0.001 (0.002)					0.002 (0.002)
Entertainment†				0.004*** (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)				−0.002** (0.001)	−0.003 (0.002)
× Democrat					0.007*** (0.002)					0.002 (0.002)
Professional and Financial†				0.012*** (0.002)	0.004*** (0.001)				0.005** (0.002)	0.008** (0.003)
× Democrat					0.013*** (0.002)					−0.009** (0.003)
Constant	0.012*** (0.003)	−0.028*** (0.001)	−0.028*** (0.001)	−0.026*** (0.001)	−0.028*** (0.001)	−0.047*** (0.004)	0.004* (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)	0.006*** (0.002)
N	185,692	185,692	185,692	185,692	185,692	201,264	201,264	201,264	201,264	201,264
Bills	437	437	437	437	437	473	473	473	473	473
Legislators	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797	797
R^2	0.15	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.12	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.11

Did Member of Congress Cosponsor the Immigration Bill?

Notes: Models include controls (not shown) for number of cosponsors, sponsor and cosponsor are same party, sponsor is a gatekeeper, sponsor is in the majority, and log mean income and employment rate of district. † Normalized. *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001.

We now turn our attention to the results for immigration legislation. Again, we start with regressions of cosponsor's party and DW-Nominate scores, dimensions 1 and 2, on the decision to cosponsor bills to establish a baseline of comparison with the economic models. Legislators are clearly divided on immigration by party and ideology. Liberals are more likely to cosponsor permissive immigration bills, while conservatives are more likely to cosponsor restrictive immigration bills. These results are consistent with previous research which finds that policy preferences for immigration are strongly partisan. Our analysis, however, suggests that economic factors may also shape legislator action on immigration. We find evidence of both a direct and indirect polarized economic effect on immigration bill cosponsorship patterns.

We then consider how variation in employment in occupation zone 1 jobs (models 2A and 2B) and how variation in employment in key industries (models 4A and 4B) predicts a legislators decision to cosponsor permissive and restrictive immigration bills. Here, manufacturing is arguably the least impacted by immigration policy since this industry general employs middle-skill workers. Agriculture and entertainment are industries that rely heavily on low-skill immigrant labor. The role of immigrants for professional and financial services industries (which does not include technology and engineering) is more complex and requires further investigation. Models 3 and 5 interact these occupation and industry variables with party of the cosponsor.

The results suggest that legislators from both parties shift partisan positions somewhat in response to district economic conditions. Consider permissive immigration bills—those that make it easier for migrants to legally enter the US workforce. Democrats from districts that employ many low-skill workers or include industries which rely heavily on these workers are more likely to cosponsor permissive immigration bills. We find that the interaction effect for Democratic cosponsor and occupation zone 1 employment, as well as the interaction terms for entertainment and professional and financial services are all significant. In comparison, occupation and industry employment does not predict the likelihood of cosponsoring permissive immigration bills for Republicans. The exception are Republicans from districts with larger employment in the professional and financial services, who are more likely than their Republican colleagues to cosponsor permissive immigration bills, even though they are still significantly less likely than Democrats to cosponsor these bills overall. All together, the results for permissive immigration cosponsorship provide evidence for hypothesis two: economic conditions produce a polarized response. Democrats from districts which likely have a

large immigrant workforce are more likely to cosponsor permissive bills.

On the flip side, for immigration restriction bills, a different story emerges. Here we find that Republicans (and not Democrats) respond to district economic conditions and their response is not polarizing. Rather, Republicans from districts that rely heavily on immigrant labor are *less* likely than other Republicans to cosponsor restrictive immigration bills. The main effect for occupation zone 1, agricultural and entertainment employment are all negatively correlated with the decision to cosponsor restrictive immigration bills in the interaction models (3B and 5B). These results suggest that there is a reluctance among Republicans from districts that rely on immigrant labor to support policies that restrict immigration. Again, the exception are Republicans from districts with large employment in the professional and financial services industries. They are more likely to support this legislation than Republicans from other districts. Note that overall, regardless of occupation and industry employment, Republicans are significantly more likely to cosponsor immigration restrictive bills than Democrats. These results suggest Republican efforts to restrict immigration are not motivated by labor market competition for low-skill jobs. Republicans from districts whose economies employ significant numbers of low-skill workers are less likely than other Republicans to cosponsor restrictive immigration bills. This correlation is consistent with a firm-led immigration story in which Republican legislators n particular are responsive to industry demands for access to low-skill labor.

7   How Gate-keeping Steers Policy Direction

The previous section argued that looking solely at bills that received a roll call vote provides an incomplete account of trade and immigration policymaking. We demonstrated that each legislator's decision to cosponsor (or not cosponsor) a given bill is a joint function of party politics and the economic characteristics of his or her district. This analysis uncovered strong evidence that trade and immigration policy reflects local labor market conditions in predictable ways. We noted that partisan factors and gate-keeping from committees and party leadership severely limit which bills ultimately are considered for roll call votes on the House floor. This process appears to "break" the direct link between economic conditions and public law. We now turn to the gate-keeping process itself to demonstrate at which points in the legislative process policy direction shifts.

Gatekeepers within the majority party have considerable power to set the policy agenda and block any legislation that does not further the party's electoral and policy goals (Mayhew, 1974). Figure 4 depicts the progression of immigration and trade bills at critical stages in the legislative process. We report the number of bills introduced, reported out of at least one committee, passed by the House, and signed into law and show the policy content proportions at each of these stages. Again, we exclude duty adjustment bills from our analysis of trade legislation.

A consistent pattern emerges for immigration across the Congresses. The mixture of permissive (blue) and restrictive (red) immigration bills is about 50-50 at introduction. This split reflects the fact that any member can sponsor legislation. Once in committee, the majority party exerts its gate-keeping powers through the committee chair and voting majority. The policy direction shifts as bills progress from committee to the House floor. A greater proportion of bills reported out of committee are permissive when Democrats are in the majority, and restrictive when Republicans are in the majority. Interestingly, permissive bills are more likely to succeed past the committee stage regardless of which party controls the chamber. The 114th Congress is the exception. Only restrictive bills made it out of committee under the leadership of a Republican party preoccupied with the upcoming presidential election. Compromise with the more moderate Senate proved impossible, and no immigration bills passed in 2015 and 2016.

Like immigration, there are differences between the policy positions of introduced versus committee-reported bills. Legislators introduced more liberalizing (red) than protectionist (blue) trade bills in the 109th, 110th, and 112th Congresses, years in which Congress passed bilateral trade agreement legislation. It is likely that many of these measures were proposed with the intent of influencing the debate over the larger trade agreement. In contrast, legislators sponsored fewer trade bills in Congresses that did not ratify trade agreements and the ratio of protective to liberalizing bills falls closer to 50-50 during these years.

As trade bills progress through critical stages, they are more likely to be liberalizing regardless of which party controls the House. Unlike immigration, the policy content of committee-reported bills is not related to which party controls the House. Democrats and Republican-controlled Congresses promote liberalizing and protectionist legislation in similar proportions. These tendencies suggest that party leadership has largely advanced a centrist bipartisan agenda on trade policy, neither strongly protectionist nor as liberalizing as local stakeholders might have it.

Figure 4: Bill Progression and Policy Position Ratio at Critical Legislative Stages by Congress

(a) Trade (Excluding Duty Adj.)

(b) Immigration

Note: Displays number of immigration bills reaching each stage in legislative process and the share of trade/immigration bills that are liberalizing/restrictive (red) or protectionist/permissive (blue).

For both issue areas, the Senate plays an important role in shaping policy content. Of the bills that became law, eleven of the fourteen immigration bills were permissive and two of the eighteen trade bills were liberalizing. Our uniquely nuanced data thus yields insight on the constituency size argument advanced in the literature. The constituency size argument predicts that House should promote more protectionist bills than the Senate. Consistent with the argument, we do find that when the Senate weighs in, policy is pushed back in a liberalizing direction. However, the argument makes certain assumptions about preference aggregation that do not find support in our data. For bills originating in the House, a large proportion are, in fact, liberalizing. It is partisan gate-keeping—not local constituencies that mobilize and demand trade protection—that steers policy in a protectionist direction. And likewise it is clear that although local economic factors might provide the seed for immigration policy, institutional gate-keeping quickly takes over, eventually fueling stark partisan divisions.

8 Discussion

The policies governing US engagement in the global economy have recently been brought to the forefront of the political debate. The US trade war with China has ballooned by some estimates to subsume $250 billion in imported goods.[17] President Trump has defended this escalating trade war as a hard-line effort to bring jobs back to Americans.[18] And on immigration, the President noted in a 2019 public address: "the annual green card flow is mostly low-wage and low-skilled. Newcomers compete for jobs against the most vulnerable Americans."[19] Likewise Democratic opposition highlights exposure to trade and poorly-designed immigration policies as the culprits in the loss of American jobs.[20] Certainly, there is little agreement between Democrats and Republicans—and

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[17]See: "Trump Announces Higher Tariffs On Goods From China After Dow Plunges 623 Points" *National Public Radio*, August 23, 2019.

[18]See: Twitter posts of July 12, 2019 4:48AM "Tariffs are a great negotiating tool, a great revenue producer and, most importantly, a powerful way to get...companies to come to the USA and to get companies that have left us for other lands to COME BACK HOME. We stupidly lost 30% of our auto business to Mexico. If the Tariffs went on at the higher level, they would all come back, and fast."

[19]"Remarks by President Trump on Modernizing Our Immigration System for a Stronger America," The White House, May 16, 2019.

[20]On trade, see Senator Bernie Sander's website, https://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-trade/, e.g. "Too often implementation of these unfair free trade agreements has resulted in massive amounts of decent paying middle class jobs being shipped overseas and the closing of tens of thousands of factories across the U.S." With respect to immigration, Bernie said in a 2013 interview that so-called immigration reforms "pushed by large corporations...results in more unemployment and lower wages for American workers," https://feelthebern.org/bernie-sanders-on-immigration/.

even dissent within each political party—in how to resolve deep seated problems in the labor market. Yet on both sides of the aisle, there is the view that many of American workers' grievances are the result of exposure to global economic forces; consequently trade and immigration policy reform must be directed at remedying labor market problems. Does this perspective originate at the local level or is it the result of political elite pushing a partisan agenda? Do local labor market conditions explain the direction of trade and immigration legislation?

Our first major finding is that local labor market conditions are directly tied to the trade and immigration bills advanced in the House of Representatives. For trade, the economic link highlights legislators' efforts to address the demands of constituents both harmed and helped by exposure to global economic pressures. Members of Congress are most likely to sponsor protectionist trade bills when their home district suffers a negative trade balance in the industries where most of the workforce is employed. The protectionist tendency is most evident in districts with a large reliance on manufacturing and, in the last dozen years, the most import competition-related job loss. Trade bill sponsorship activity is consistent with a job-protection story.

When it comes to legislators' decisions to cosponsor trade bills, the patterns are particularly striking. When Democrats represent districts with a negative trade balance and districts with a large manufacturing workforce, they are even more likely to cosponsor *protectionist* bills than their Republican counterparts. These bills reflect efforts to staunch import competition that affects jobs central to the district's economy. On the other hand, the decision to cosponsor trade *liberalizing* bills does not reflect district-level exposure to trade. These latter bills garner bipartisan cosponsorship across many districts and tend to reflect consensus-building efforts among legislators to advance free-trade interests. The contrast in support patterns between protectionist and liberalizing bills is consistent with mobilization arguments advanced in the trade politics literature. Groups that are adversely impacted by trade—import competing industries and workers therein—have a strong incentive to petition their representatives for trade protection. They are thought to be more successful at politically mobilizing than groups that benefit from more liberal trade policy, e.g. consumers, exporter industries (but see: Gilligan (1997)). The push for more liberal trade policies comes not from districts with concentrated interests but from broader consensus-building across Congress. This point is reinforced by our gate-keeping evidence, as discussed below.

Yet when it comes to immigration bills advanced in the House, legislators' decisions do not appear

to reflect efforts to mitigate job-loss. Our conclusions are based on the understanding that just under half (46%) of employed foreign-born workers have a high-school education or less and are thus working in low-skilled occupations.[21] Legislators from districts with the most reliance on low-skilled labor do not support restrictive immigration policies, as a job protection story would suggest. Rather than reduce the competition felt by native workers, they actually tend to promote more *permissive* immigration bills. The tendency is consistent with the idea that Members of Congress are very responsive to firms' interests—and their demands for greater access to a low-wage labor force. This is clearly shown in sponsorship decisions. There is a strong, statistically significant correlation between a district's reliance on the lowest skilled workers and the MC sponsoring permissive immigration bills. Thus while local labor market factors *do* explain immigration bill sponsorship, they matter in a different way than political rhetoric would suggest.

Our cosponsorship analysis of immigration bills highlights industry-specific determinants. It shows that districts with a large demand for agriculture and entertainment (especially food service) workers are especially supportive of permissive and un-supportive of restrictive immigration bills. We also observe Democrats and Republicans alike support permissive immigration bills when their districts have a large portion of the workforce employed in professional and financial services. Anecdotally speaking, firms in these districts tend to push for high-skilled worker visas. Republicans from districts with a large professional/financial service workforce also tend to cosponsor immigration restrictions. We suspect that these MCs are making strategic trade-offs. They are likely to support policy to *increase* high-skill immigration visas in exchange for *decreasing* low skill-immigration visas. More work is needed to evaluate this potential explanation. Beyond these high-skill intensive districts, there are a variety of forces driving immigration restrictions—many social and cultural. What is clear is that support for immigration restrictions cannot be attributed to locales where low-skilled immigrant workers are most likely to compete with native workers.

Our second key point relies on comparing trade to immigration bills. It will perhaps come as a welcome confirmation for political scientists that party affiliation and ideology are far stronger explanations of immigration bill support than they are of trade. Despite the current political debate that frames trade politics in the language of class conflict and associated cultural divisions, legislator

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[21]Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor Report of May 16, 2019, available: `https://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t01.htm`.

position-taking on trade is ultimately about the economy. At the same time a legislator's party and DW-Nominate scores are major predictors of immigration bill support. In both sponsorship and cosponsorship activity, MCs with a conservative record—reliably Republican—strongly prefer immigration restrictions while MCs with a liberal voting record—reliably Democrat—prefer permissive immigration reform. This is no doubt the case because immigration activates so many complicated sentiments about in-group and out-group, identity politics, and normative debates. Put differently, MCs do often choose to cosponsor bills *against* their traditional party platforms when it comes to trade, suggesting that in the absence of heated normative debates, economic incentives are perhaps better represented.

None of the aforementioned findings would be possible had we limited our study to the trade and immigration bills receiving roll call votes, as so much of the previous literature has done. Our examination of all bills introduced in the House on these two critical topics reveals economic and partisan determinants that are obscured as the legislative process advances. One might argue that this vast set of "forgotten" bills culled from the legislative agenda are irrelevant; the only important bills are those that receive a roll call vote and thereby stand a chance of becoming public law. We can point to several reasons why the broader set of legislation remains important. For one, nearly half of the bills in our dataset that do receive a vote get a voice vote, not a roll call vote. Thus a large portion of legislation that earns serious consideration is not reflected in the roll call voting records. More pointedly, by looking at the key stages of the legislative process, we can better understand how economic and partisan factors contribute to policy. Many introduced bills that are discarded early on shape the political debate. Some are folded into broader bills that do gain bipartisan support; others highlight contentious issues that party leadership must address if they are to pass major reforms. Our novel dataset on the *direction* of all trade and immigration bills introduced crucially reveals how bills traverse the committee stage and other key stages, and their correlations with important district-level features of the labor market. We presented only a small subset of the insights these rich data can offer.

This leads to our third key result: gate-keeping shifts the direction of trade and immigration policy. Between introduction and passage, the average policy position of trade bills reaching a given stage moves from protectionist to liberalizing. As more Members of Congress weigh in on a proposed piece of trade legislation and as party elite exercise their influence, the process brings

in voices representing a wider range of districts. These corresponding trends—the broader and more diverse the constituency represented the more the policy position moves from protectionist to liberalizing—is consistent with arguments in the trade policy literature. It suggests that gate-keeping may help to steer policy away from serving niche or narrow interests toward the interests of a broad collection of industries and constituents. We see a related progression on immigration bills from restrictive toward permissive but here suspect it is that party discipline guides the attrition process. There is a range of anti-immigration groups that have pushed for tighter borders. But in the current political climate, some powerful firms have successfully advocated more permissive immigration policy, potentially to serve their workforce demands. In this respect, legislative gate-keeping may help propel the pendulum into a permissive direction.

Along with these findings, our analysis also raises pointed questions for further research. The first question involves the contrast between trade and immigration policy-making. We have argued that with respect to trade policy, firm and worker interests are well-aligned whereas with respect to immigration policy they are not. This may explain why legislators seem to be responsive to workers' protectionist trade interests and firms' permissive immigration interests. We also suspect there are discrepancies in political influence that drive these results. Import competition has hardest hit the manufacturing sector across America. Workers in this sector have a strong history of political mobilization; unionization has given this portion of the labor market a strong voice that members of Congress cannot ignore. The effects of off-shoring are acutely felt in communities making trade protection a top priority in these locations. It is in these locales that industry interests and worker interests are well-aligned and enjoy sufficient political influence to sway legislator preferences.

The political mobilization story differs for immigration. The portions of the native labor force that might conceivably to compete with immigrant workers for low-skill jobs (e.g. farm workers; restaurant kitchen staff) have little political standing. It is possible that native workers simply do not want these jobs or, if they do see a threat, they have few means for political mobilization to pressure their legislators. Firms and ideologues easily fill the political vacuum and demand immigration policies that further their permissive or restrictive agendas. Future research could unpack the source of discrepancies between trade and immigration.

Future research could also uncover the mechanisms driving the political polarization tendencies. We have focused on the different policy leanings of Democrats and Republicans when they are con-

fronted with similar local labor market conditions. However, by examining correlations alone, we cannot distinguish between a differential partisan response—perhaps driven by the ideological lens a legislator adopts—and an underlying selection process. It may be that unobserved district characteristics drive the election of Democratic or Republican MCs who then advance their party's agenda in Congress. By employing a matching research design, we might identify differential responses of legislators by their party. We might also gain traction on causal mechanisms by examining the *geography* of new immigration. Historically, immigrants to the US have clustered in a small number of large metropolitan areas and this concentration has increased over time (Borjas et al., 1997; Money, 1997). Some studies indicate that recent years have brought a marked shift. Many immigrants are now following job opportunities to small (mid-western) cities and rural America (Jensen, 2006). With some modifications, our data contain the geographical and temporal granularity to use a difference-in-difference research design to isolate precisely how shifts in the foreign-born workforce might prompt shifts in legislator support of immigration reform.

A final point of inquiry we intend to explore is whether the correlations we observe between policy and labor market determinants are long-standing or an anomalous effect of shifts in the global economy. For trade, a key shift is the so-called "China shock" (Autor, Dorn, and Hanson, 2013a). China's export surge in manufacturing accelerated after 2001, the year in which the country entered the World Trade Organization. Likewise, the 1994 North American Free Trade Area is widely thought to have adversely impacted Mexico's agriculture sector, driving small farmers to migrate north in search of work (Martin, 1998-1999; Andreas, 1998; Fernández-Kelly and Massey, 2007; Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016). By extending our data back in time to earlier Congresses, we can uncover potential drivers of the protectionist push on trade and anti-immigration policymaking.

While we open as many questions as we resolve, we believe this study is an major step in advancing the joint analysis of trade and immigration policy. Economists have long highlighted their link through the labor market, but we show that markets alone cannot provide a satisfactory account of why policy takes the form it does. It is here that political science can offer crucial insights on why proposed legislation unevenly reflects economic conditions and how party discipline and the legislative process generate public law. By examining economic incentives alongside power in Congress, we can better understand the transformation of trade and immigration policy, as the United States continually calibrates is integration in the global economy.

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Appendix

A1 Additional Data Details

Legislator Action, Committees, and Bill Progression

This Appendix described additional details about our data.

- Only a select few bills are reported out of committee. When a bill is assigned to several committees, one committee will have primary oversight over the bill. It is common practice that the other committees will be discharged from consideration of the bill once the primary committee has reported the bill. A committee may also be discharged from consideration with a discharge petition signed by 218 members. Discharge petitions were filed for three bills in the data set, however all failed to obtain the necessary number of signatures.

- As discussed in Section 4 above, we constructed a complete member file, which indicates each Member of Congress's decision to or not to cosponsor for every bill introduced in the congress in which he or she was serving. There are a handful of cases where members departed the seat partway through a Congress and were replaced by another Representative, sometimes of a different party. Death, scandal and retirement explain this turnover. In our dataset, it is not possible to attribute the decision NOT to sponsor or cosponsor a bill to the appropriate member—the original seat-holder or their replacement. For this reason, districts represented by more than one member in a Congress were dropped from our member file. Because these dropped cases are due to scandal, death, and retirement, they can be safely regarded as exogenous events. And even if they appear in non-random ways, they are almost certainly unrelated to trade and immigration policy. Their omission should not affect our analysis since there are so few cases of turnover in each Congress and they are orthogonal to our substantive inquiry. We note that this turnover problem did not apply to our sponsorship, cosponsorship and roll call vote data since, in these cases, it is possible to attribute actions to the appropriate member.

A2 Supplementary Statistical Results

Cosponsorship patterns help to indicate whether bills are given serious consideration in Congress. Most bills—about 3000 in our dataset—attracted no cosponsor support at all. About 800 bills received support from between 1 and 10 cosponsors. A small number of bills capture broad support from over a hundred cosponsors. For trade policy, the Congresses behaved fairly similarly to one another. Most trade bills received few or no cosponsors while a small number garnered widespread support. By contrast, immigration bills displayed more variety. Some Congresses also showed an all-or-nothing approach. Other Congresses featured plenty of immigration bills that attracted a moderate number of cosponsors. This can be seen by plotting the cumulative distributions of cosponsors by issue area and Congress, as shown in Figure A.1.

Figure A.1: Cumulative Distribution of the Number of Cosponsors per Bill

(a) Trade

(b) Immigration

Looking just at bills that received at least one cosponsor, we can assess the prevalence of co- and cross-partisan cosponsorship in each issue area and over time. Figure A.2 plots the average number of cosponsors bills receive by the sponsor's party, the cosponsors' parties, and by Congress.

Figure A.2: Average Number of Co- and Cross-Partisan Cosponsors by Bill Sponsor's Party

(a) Trade

(b) Immigration

Note: Only bills with at least one cosponsor are used in calculations. Red solid line denotes Republican cosponsors on Republican-sponsored bills. Red dotted line denotes Democrat cosponsors on Republican-sponsored bills. Blue solid line denotes Democrat cosponsors on Democrat-sponsored bills. Blue dotted line denotes Republican cosponsors on Democrat-sponsored bills.

Figure A.2(a) shows that for trade bills, there is quite a bit of cosponsorship across party lines. Even though the majority of a bill's cosponsors come from the sponsor's own party, we still observe frequent cross-partisan support. This is most noticeable in the 112th and 113th Congresses. Republican-sponsored bills attracted nearly as many Democrats as cosponsors as they did cosponsors from within the party. By contrast, cosponsorship patterns for immigration legislation reflect stark partisan divisions (Figure A.2(b)). The vast majority of a bill's cosponsors hail from the sponsor's own party (solid lines). Both Republican- and Democrat- sponsored immigration bills garner plenty of support from their own respective parties in each congress. Yet they tend to receive very few cosponsors across the aisle (dotted lines), regardless of the sponsor's own party affiliation. The message is: the direction trade policy has taken, especially in more recent years, reflects cross-partisan efforts. Immigration policy, by contrast, remains deeply divided along party lines.

COSPONSORSHIP REGRESSIONS

Table A.1 largely confirms the sponsorship analysis presented in the main paper, Section 5. The results reinforce Hypothesis 1 by demonstrating additional evidence for a direct link between local economic conditions and the direct of policy that legislators support. Support is demonstrated not only in bill sponsorship but also in *cosponsorship* activity. Indeed, by signing their name onto a bill that is not their own, legislators take a stand for the trade and immigration policies that represent the interests of the workforce in their districts.

For the cosponsorship analysis, a positive extraction trade balance is associated with protectionist policy. When a district is a major exporter of raw materials, it tends to favor raising trade barriers. This holds whether we look at all trade bills or exclusively non-duty bills which tend to be the main recipients of cosponsor support. Manufacturing trade balance yields weaker results in the

cosponsorship analysis. For immigration bills, the correlations in the sponsor analysis are strengthened in the cosponsor analysis. Districts with a large share of their workforce in construction and manufacturing tend to favor more restrictive immigration bills, potentially to stave off competition. Locations reliant on low-skill occupation employment tend to be focused on service sector jobs and feature some of the highest density of immigrant workers (often in urban areas). Legislators from these districts are more likely to cosponsor permissive immigration bills.

We also use the cosponsorship data to probe Hypothesis 2, the partisan polarization effect. Table A.2 provides results of linear regression models with the cosponsor data. We restrict the focus to only bills that received support from at least one MC besides the sponsor. We regress policy position on the economic characteristics of the cosponsor's district *interacted with the cosponsor's party*. Control variables are the district log mean income, district employment rate, and the total number of cosponsors on the bill (log count). Standard errors are clustered by legislator.

There are two key findings in Table A.2. First, the apparent effect of district economic characteristics on bill direction rarely differs by the cosponsor's party. Democrats and Republicans respond to the local labor market in similar ways. Legislators from districts experiencing large trade deficits weighted by industry of employment tend to cosponsor protectionist bills, regardless of party. Likewise, Democrat and Republican legislators representing districts with a large low-skill workforce (occupation zone 1) both show a preference for cosponsoring permissive immigration bills. The industry where we do see a partisan split is agriculture. Republicans eagerly cosponsor trade liberalization and permissive immigration policy when a large portion of their district's workforce is employed in agriculture, a position consistent with both their traditional party ideology and local business interests. Democrats also lean toward liberalizing trade policies in districts with large agriculture employment but less so. On immigration, Democrats from agricultural districts lean slightly in the restrictive direction. This analysis lends little support to H2, the partisan polarization (conditional effects) hypothesis.

The second key finding is that party affiliation is a far stronger determinant for cosponsorship of immigration bills than trade bills. Party routinely explains a larger portion of the variance in immigration bill direction. By contrast, the district level economic controls—mean income and employment rate—are far stronger determinants of cosponsorship decisions on trade. This reaffirms the conventional wisdom that while trade policy is almost entirely an economic issue, immigration policy reflects complicated ideological issues apart from economic concerns.

Table A.1: Linear Regression of Bill Direction on District Characteristics for Cosponsors in 109th to 114th Congresses

Bill Direction	Trade			Immigration	
	1 = protectionist			1 = permissive	
	−1 = liberalizing			−1 = restrictive	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrat Coponsor	0.43**	0.42**	0.42**	1.33**	1.31**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Weighted Trade Balance†	−0.04**	−0.04**			
	(0.01)	(0.01)			
Manufacturing Trade Balance†			−0.03*		
			(0.01)		
Occupation Zone 1				4.89**	
				(1.60)	
Agriculture					1.40
					(0.91)
Manufacturing					−0.29
					(0.31)
Entertainment					1.66**
					(0.49)
Professional and Financial					0.83·
					(0.44)
Log. Mean Income		−0.46**	−0.57**	0.28**	0.12·
		(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Employment Rate		2.94**	3.30**	0.02	
		(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.30)	
Log. Cosponsors		0.14**	0.09**	0.02**	0.02**
		(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	−0.06·	2.08**	3.18**	−3.88**	−2.32**
	(0.03)	(0.78)	(0.77)	(0.64)	(0.77)
N	7,995	7,995	7,753	15,194	15,194
Bills	526	526	392	768	768
Cosponsors	776	776	775	799	799
Sample	Trade	Trade	Non-Duty	Immigr.	Immigr.
Controls?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R^2	0.06	0.13	0.11	0.49	0.49

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Linear regressions with clustered standard errors by cosponsor.
†Normalized. Sponsors excluded from analysis.

Table A.2: Linear Regression of Cosponsored Bill Direction on District Characteristics for 109th to 114th Congresses

Bill Direction	Trade			Immigration	
	1 = protectionist			1 = permissive	
	−1 = liberalizing			−1 = restrictive	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Democrat Cosponsor	0.42**	0.42**	0.02	1.30**	1.12**
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.29)	(0.08)	(0.22)
Weighted Trade Balance†	−0.02	−0.02			
	(0.02)	(0.02)			
×Democrat	−0.02	−0.02			
	(0.03)	(0.03)			
Occupation Zone 1				3.96	
				(3.76)	
×Democrat				1.33	
				(3.90)	
Agriculture			−3.40*		3.33**
			(1.53)		(1.16)
×Democrat			2.44		−3.78*
			(1.96)		(1.51)
Manufacturing			−0.41		−0.12
			(0.65)		(0.51)
×Democrat			1.57·		−0.45
			(0.83)		(0.63)
Entertainment			−2.55*		1.53
			(1.28)		(1.06)
×Democrat			0.93		0.23
			(1.47)		(1.16)
Professional and Financial			−0.60		0.22
			(0.79)		(0.57)
×Democrat			0.68		1.40*
			(0.91)		(0.63)
Log. Mean Income	−0.46**	−0.54**	−0.43**	0.28**	0.12
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Employment Rate	2.97**	3.28**	2.41**	0.01	0.05
	(0.40)	(0.41)	(0.40)	(0.30)	(0.32)
Log Cosponsors	0.14**	0.09**	0.14**	0.02**	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.04**	2.95**	2.60**	−3.85**	−2.25**
	(0.78)	(0.80)	(0.92)	(0.65)	(0.82)
N	7,995	7,753	7,995	15,194	15,194
Bills	526	392	526	768	768
Cosponsors	776	775	776	799	799
Sample	Trade	Non-Duty	Trade	Immigr.	Immigr.
R^2	0.13	0.11	0.13	0.49	0.49

Note: *p<0.05; **p<0.01. Linear regressions with clustered standard errors by cosponsor.
†Normalized. Sponsors excluded from analysis.